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I. INTRODUCTION
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right
of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards
commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and pro-
motes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging prac-
tices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial dis-
putes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other
working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining
power between employers and employees.'
The restoration of equality of bargaining power was felt necessary
because of the inequality that existed between "employees who do not
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and em-
ployers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership
* Member of the Editorial Board, University of Miami Law Review.
1. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), passed in 1935, was comprehensively
amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act). Further sup-
plemental amendments occurred with the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act).
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association .... Management, in an effort to salvage its share of this
bargaining power, continually tests the limits of its freedom to effectively
run the business enterprise. Overstepping the boundary usually results in
a charge of unfair labor practice.
A labor strike and its aftermath provide a context in which manage-
ment can react to test the limits of its freedom. The United States Su-
preme Court, in two recent decisions,' considered such reactions by
management in light of the policy of the National Labor Relations Act'
and, more particularly, in light of sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) of that
Act.5 The methodology and the reasoning of these decisions point to a
discernible, perhaps inevitable, trend in the law of labor relations.
II. THE PLACE OF THE STRIKE WITHIN THE LAW
A. A Traditional Self-help Technique
The labor movement in this country has sought to achieve certain
ultimate objectives for the worker. These objectives include better wages,
better working conditions and economic security. In order to attain such
objectives, labor has used three basic self-help techniques: the strike,
the picket, and the boycott.' It should be kept in mind that these tech-
niques are often used simultaneously so as to become conceptually in-
distinguishable. With minimal risk of real-world inaccuracy, however,
only the strike will be examined in this article.
In an early case decided prior to the major labor-relations legisla-
tion, it was held that the strike weapon must be related to a legitimate
union objective.7 Justice Brandeis, finding that the strike was not justi-
fied because it was not called for a permissible purpose,8 concluded:
The right to carry on business-be it called liberty or prop-
erty-has value. To interfere with this right without cause is
unlawful. The fact that the injury was inflicted by a strike is
sometimes a justification. But a strike may be illegal because of
its purpose, however orderly the manner in which it is con-
ducted.9
2. Id.
3. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967) ; NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers,
Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
4. The amended National Labor Relations Act will hereinafter be referred to as NLRA.
The Labor Management Relations Act provisions independent of those amending the NLRA
will hereinafter be referred to as LMRA. The NLRA, as amended by the LMRA, will be
referred to as simply the Act unless clarity requires the full name.
5. NLRA §§ 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3) (1964).
6. See generally 51A C.J.S. Labor Relations §§ 273-86 (1967).
7. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926).
8. Id. at 309:
[Tihere was no trade dispute. There had been no controversy between the company
and the union over wages, hours, or conditions of labor; over discipline or the
discharge of an employee; concerning the observance of rules; nor over the em-
ployment of non-union labor. Nor was the strike ordered as a sympathetic one in
aid of others engaged in any such controversy.
9. Id. at 311. (Emphasis added.) Here, the collection of a stale claim due a union
member formerly employed in the business was held not to be a permissible purpose.
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Thus, the legality of a strike depends primarily upon its purpose.
B. Attributes of a Strike
A strike is a concerted action by employees to improve their position
in the collective bargaining process 0 by a concerted refusal to work."
The refusal to work the number of hours required by the employer is
sufficient to constitute a strike.' However, mere intermittent work
stoppage by employees is not within the "concerted activity" definition
of a strike." Nor is conduct of employees who refuse to perform certain
portions of their work, while continuing to perform others, within the
definition.'
A broader denotation is given the refusal-to-work attribute by the
LMRA section 501(2): "The term 'strike' includes . . . any concerted
slowdown or other concerted interruption of operations by employees." 5
This inclusion of slowdowns, however, technically applies only where
the word "strike" is used in the LMRA. 6 The statute therefore does not
contemplate using such a definition to support the language of NLRA
sections 7 and 8(a), which merely refer to "concerted activities."' 7
C. The Right to Strike
The raised sledge-hammer of employees and unions in the form of
the threat of a strike, as well as the blow of the hammer in the form of
the strike itself, are legally recognized as economic weapons in the collec-
See also Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Alliance v. Greenwood, 249 Ala. 265,
30 So.2d 696 (1947), for a state court analysis relating the strike technique to labor
objectives.
10. This definition is inferred from the language of NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964):
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... (Emphasis added).
11. Under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Amendents it is no longer
necessary, as it was under the NLRA as amended in 1947, to prove that a union induced
or encouraged a concerted work stoppage in order to establish a violation of § 8(b) (4),
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1964).
See United Mine Workers v. U.S., 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1949), where a simultaneous
termination of work by approximately 300,000 union members throughout the nation's
mining industry was held a strike.
12. A strike exists when a group of employees cease work in order to secure compli-
ance with a demand for higher wages, shorter hours, or other conditions of employ-
ment, the refusal of which by the employer has given rise to a labor dispute. The
cessation of work by a group is no less a strike because the group itself may not
have considered its action to constitute a strike .... [A] refusal to work the number
of hours required by an employer is tantamount to an absolute refusal to work.
American Mfg. Concern, 7 N.L.R.B. 753 (1938).
13. Local 232, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 250 Wis. 550, 27 N.W.2d
875 (1947), dissent in 28 N.W.2d 254 (1947), aff'd, 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
14. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946), rev'g 64 N.L.R.B.
432 (1945).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 142(2) (1964).
16. NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1964) (strikes declared unfair labor
practices) ; LMRA § 206, 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1964) (strikes imperiling the national health or
safety).
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a) (1964).
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tive bargaining process. Except for specific provisions, nothing in the
Act "shall be construed so as to either interfere with or impede or di-
minish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qual-
ifications on that right."8 Section 13 operates as a rule of statutory inter-
pretation to preclude the inference of any limitations on the right to
strike from provisions of the Act which do not specifically establish such
limitations." In the face of the underlying policy of the Act to negotiate
in good faith, the United States Supreme Court has approved legitimate
use of the strike as an economic weapon.20
A strike may be called to protest an unfair labor practice com-
mitted by the employer,2 ' to protest a refusal to bargain, 2 to protest a
company rule, -8 or to gain recognition of a union as the employees' bar-
gaining agent. 24 Although the right to strike is not limited to these
instances, neither is it an absolute right, even apart from the specific
statutory restrictions. For example, employees who otherwise have the
right to strike are not authorized to walk off their jobs where to do so
would endanger their employer's property.25 Furthermore, the right to
strike is vitiated where the strike depends on violence for its efficacy or
where it occurs in an environment of harm to persons and destruction of
property.2 If the whole strike is unlawful because volence or a sitdown 27
takes place, the strikers are not only subject to the criminal laws for
18. NLRA § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1964).
Specific restrictions on the right to strike appear at NLRA § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b).
Reference is made there to restrictions in cases of secondary boycotts, recognition and orga-
nizational picketing, or coercive picketing accompanied by the use of force or violence,
jurisdictional disputes, and others.
19. See Local 232, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
20. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). Fully aware of the logical
inconsistency between negotiation and economic weapons, the Court, at 489, stated that:
at the present statutory stage of our national labor relations policy, the two factors
-necessity for good faith bargaining between parties and the availability of eco-
nomic pressure devices to each to make the other party incline to agree on one's
terms--exist side by side.
21. E.g., NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
22. E.g., NLRB v. Remington Rand, 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1938), holding that resort to
a strike to compel bargaining, instead of filing an unfair labor practice charge with the
Board, was a proper exercise of the right to strike.
23. E.g., NLRB v. Delsea Iron Works, Inc., 316 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1963), holding that
a strike to protest the company's no smoking rule was protected, even though no demand
to rescind or modify the rule was given to the employer prior to the walkout.
24. United Mine Workers, Dist. 50 v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956)
(recognition strike is limited only by another union's certification).
25. NLRB v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co., 212 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1954) (em-
ployer's property endangered by leaving fires and boiler rooms unattended).
26. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
In this regard, note that the Norris-La Guardia Act (an anti-injunction statute) pro-
tects only peaceably conducted labor activities from injunction. Employers, moreover, may
discharge strikers who have been guilty of violent conduct even though under NLRA § 8(a),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964), discharge of strikers is normally an unfair labor practice. See,
e.g., Bershire Knitting Mills v. NLRB, 139 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1943).
27. In a sitdown strike the strikers simply take possession of the business, barricade
it against entry by both management and other employees, and sometimes inflict damage to
business property.
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damage to property, but they also forfeit whatever rights to which they
might otherwise have been entitled under the Act.28
D. Economic or Unfair Labor Practice Strikes
Assuming that a strike is for a lawful purpose and is not within the
prohibitions of the Act, it must be characterized initially as either an
economic strike or an unfair labor practice strike. If a strike is charac-
terized as economic, it must then be examined under the "conversion"
theory. Such characterization has taken place primarily by court decision,
as the Act neither requires categorization nor states the requisites.29
An economic strike is generally one called either for better wages
and working conditions or for union recognition. Put negatively, it is
neither caused nor prolonged by an employer's unfair labor practices,
nor is it in breach of a valid existing contract." On the other hand, an
unfair labor practice strike is caused, or extended in whole or part, by
an employer's unfair labor practices. If an unfair labor practice occurs
prior to the strike, a rebuttable presumption is raised that it must have
been one of the causes. If the employer can show that it was not a con-
tributing factor, the strike will be characterized as economic.
A strike initially characterized as an economic strike may later be
converted into an unfair labor practice strike because the employer com-
mitted illegal practices in combatting it."' The lapse of time between the
commission of the unfair labor practice and -the start of the strike may
preclude a finding of conversion; 2 furthermore, "an employer's unfair
labor practices during an economic strike do not per se convert it into
an unfair labor practice strike, absent proof of causal relationship be-
tween the unfair labor practices and the prolongation of the strike.
33
Nevertheless, the National Labor Relations Board34 and the courts will
find strike conversion per se for two unfair practices: (1) refusal to
bargain or (2) employer domination and support of a labor organization. a5
E. Rights of Employees and Obligations of the Employer
Characterization of a strike is important because it determines the
status of the employees and the union, and the obligations that the em-
28. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
29. NLRA § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1964), indirectly recognizes the charac-
terization requirement when it delineates the voting rights of "employees engaged in an
economic strike who are not entitled to reinstatement." (Emphasis added).
30. See generally 1 B. WERNE, LABOR RELATIoNs LAW & PRACTICE ch. 16 (1966, Supp.
1968).
31. See, e.g., Federal Dairy Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1158 (1961), aff'd, 297 F.2d 487 (1st
Cir. 1962); DeSoto Hardwood Flooring Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 382 (1951).
32. Jordan Bus Co., 107 N.L.R.B. No. 148 (1954), held that an economic strike which
started six weeks after the unfair labor practices retained its character as an economic
strike.
33. Harcourt & Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 892, 909 (1952).
34. Hereinafter referred to as the Board.
35. NLRB v. Pecheur Lozenge Co., 209 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1953); Crosby Chem., Inc.,
85 N.L.R.B. 791 (1949).
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ployer owes the striking participants varies according to their status."
An employer has the right to keep his business operating, and to this end
he may fill the jobs that the strikers leave vacant;3 7 that is, where the
strike being conducted is characterized as economic, the employer may
hire permanent replacements for the strikers."8 More specifically, an em-
ployer has a legal right to replace economic strikers "at will" regardless
of the motive for the replacement. 9 Consequently, if a permanent re-
placement is hired, the employer is not legally obligated to reinstate the
striker upon termination of the strike.40 The economic striker, therefore,
risks the possibility of job forfeiture in the event of his being perma-
nently replaced. Should the employer fail to permanently replace a
striker, however, he is entitled to reinstatement upon his unconditional
request." Even though no strikers are permanently replaced, they may
not be entitled to reinstatement if they have been guilty of violence or
other illegal conduct during the strike.4 2
Unlike economic strikers, the unfair labor practice strikers cannot
be replaced permanently unless they have committed prohibited acts
during the strike.43 The employer is obligated to rehire such strikers
when they desire to return to their jobs. If the jobs of the unfair practice
strikers are abolished during the strike, the employer must grant them
the right to preferential hiring.44 This preference, which is not lost to
the striker even when there is a no-strike clause in the contract,4 has
36. Binder Metal Prod., Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 1662 (1965).
37. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938). Giving permanent
employee status to a replacement was held to be proper, despite the fact that it was in
derogation of the strikers' rights, because it was reasonably necessary for carrying on his
business operations.
38. Id.
Noteworthy is the fact that permanently replaced economic strikers are eligible for
unemployment insurance payments. Ruberoid Co. v. California, U.I.A.B. 27 Cal. Rptr. 878,
378 P.2d 102 (1963).
39. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 802 (1964). However, such motive must not
amount to an independent unlawful purpose.
40. It logically follows that the union risks its status as the employees' bargaining
agent. If enough replacements are hired so that the non-union employees outnumber the
union strikers, a petition for an election may be filed with the Board to determine whether
the union has majority representation. If the Board orders the election, both replaced
strikers and replacements are entitled to vote. NLRA § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964).
41. Roure-Dupont Mfg. Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1240 (1951).
Reinstatement rights are accorded such strikers because strikers retain their status as
employees. NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964).
42. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Co., 306 U.S. 240 (1939); American Tool Works
Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1681 (1956) (denial of reinstatement where economic strikers used pro-
fanity to non-striking employees; also where striker stepped in front of truck trying to
enter employer's plant). But cf. Schott Metal Products Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 310 (1961);
Stewart Hog Ring Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 415 (1960).
43. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Maurice Embroidery
Works, 111 N.L.R.B. 1143 (1955).
44. J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 388 (1956), enforced, 245 F.2d 594 (5th
Cir. 1957).
45. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956), holding that unfair labor
practice strikers could not be discharged for violating the contract.
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been extended to include their reinstatement to "substantially equiv-
alent" jobs.46
An employer may, however, refuse to reinstate unfair labor practice
strikers on the grounds of violent activity which had as its purpose the
intimidation of nonstriking employees or the creation of dangerous situa-
tions for them.4" On the other hand, although economic factors may have
added to the decision to strike, if there is a causal connection between
the employer's unfair labor practices and the strike the employer may
not refuse reinstatement to the strikers. 8
III. THE POLICY OF THE ACT WITH RESPECT TO PROTECTION
OF EMPLOYEES
A. Rights of and Status as Employees
The employees' right to use the strike weapon is afforded direct
protection by section 7 of the NLRA, 49 which guarantees that employees
shall have the right to engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . ." Since the
essential attribute of a strike is a concerted refusal to work,50 it is most
certainly within the guaranteed rights of section 7. The right to engage
in a strike, however, would be an empty one unless the striker retained
his status as an employee. To this end, section 2(3) defines "employee"
as including "any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of,
or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair
labor practice, and who had not obtained any other regular and sub-
stantially equivalent employment ... ."', From the status of the striker
as an employee stems his right to reinstatement, absent violent or un-
lawful misconduct on his part, unless he is permanently replaced as an
economic striker.8 2
B. Employer Unfair Labor Practices under Sections
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3)
The guarantees of section 7 (and section 13) are implemented by
the unfair labor practice definitions of section 8(a)." Acts of employer
interference and discrimination against employee rights constitute unfair
46. Elmire Mach. & Specialty Works, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1695 (1964). But cf. American
Mfg. Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 226 (1952), rev'd, 203 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1953), which held that an
offer of reinstatement to the same job on another shift was no violation.
47. Oneita Knitting Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 64 L.R.R.M. 2724 (4th Cir. 1967) (egg-
throwing at cars). This rule does not encompass trivial or isolated incidents.
48. Winter Garden Citrus Prods. Coop., 114 N.L.R.B. 1048 (1955), modified, 238 F.2d
128 (5th Cir. 1956).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
90. See text at notes 10-17 supra.
51. NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964).
52. See Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) and text discussion at note 35
supra.
53. NLRA § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964).
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labor practices. Thus, section 8(a) (1) provides that it is unfair for an
employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 7"; section 8(a)(3) declares -that it
is unfair for an employer to "discourage membership in any labor orga-
nization" by acts of discrimination. These sections often have inter-
changing and overlapping roles in the context of a strike. Thus, their
interrelationship54 is vital to a thorough understanding of the reasoning
of the United States Supreme Court in recent cases. 5
Section 8(a)(1) prohibits all forms of interference with section 7
rights, whereas section 8(a) (3) applies only to discrimination -that dis-
courages or encourages membership in a labor organization. Thus section
8(a) (1) is broader, encompassing both the means used by the employer
as well as the employee rights affected. The test of discrimination
requires either (1) an intent to discourage (or encourage) union mem-
bership or (2) an intent to do an act which naturally tends to discourage
(or encourage) union membership.56 It becomes a question of fact as to
whether the employer's act has a rational basis or whether it is a mere
sham for anti-union bias.
C. The Relationship Between the Subsections
Discrimination in retaliation for a strike has a natural tendency to
discourage union membership in a labor organization; therefore, the
narrow test of section 8(a) (3) is met. 7 However, since the discrimina-
tion is also an interference with protected concerted activity, a violation
of the broader interference test under section 8(a) (1) is made out even
though it does not discourage membership in a labor organization.58 The
same discriminatory act may therefore constitute a violation of both
sections. As a result, the Board may find it more convenient to proceed
under section 8(a)(1) rather than prove a case under section 8(a)(3),
which might be more difficult.
The propriety of this course of action is questionable in light of the
original concept of the relationship between the subsections; 8(a) (2)
through 8(a) (5) were considered specifically-described instances of un-
fair labor practices, whereas 8 (a) (1) was considered the generic "catch-
all" unfair labor practice. 59 This is not to say, however, that one of the
specific practice subsections would govern, in a particular case, to the
54. See generally Pate, Effect of Strike Misconduct on Reinstatement Rights of Em-
ployees, 15 J. PuB. L. 150, 151-53 (1966), for the relationship between the discrimination
test of § 8(a) (3) and the interference test of § 8(a) (1) in the context of strike misconduct.
55. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967); NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
56. Cf. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
57. E.g., European Cars Ypsilanti, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 1595 (1962).
58. E.g., Sherry Mfg. Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 739 (19.60).
59. Art Metals Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 110 F.2d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 1940).
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exclusion of 8(a)(1); rather, the specific practice subsections were not
intended to limit the application of the generic section."'
The categorization of the subsections, coupled with the congres-
sional conception of their relationship, led to independent significance
for the language of each subsection and, in turn, to separate judicial
tests for each subsection. Particular fact situations were analyzed ex-
clusively in terms of the language of one of the specific practice sub-
sections. When one of these subsections was violated, the courts always
found an additional violation of section 8(a)(1). Such a finding, how-
ever, was implicitly dependent upon the finding of a violation of a
specific practice subsection." 1 In effect, then, what constituted an inter-
ference with an employee's rights under section 7 was to be determined
by the language and tests of the other subsections. 2
D. Intertwining Subsections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3)
In some cases involving discriminatory conduct, and therefore a
construction of section 8(a)(3), it is found that the employer's conduct
does not violate the LMRA if it does not violate the discrimination test
of section 8(a) (3) of the Act." The discrimination test depends pri-
marily upon the employer's intent to discriminate or to do the act which
discriminates; his unlawful conduct in discouraging a strike will result
in an unfair labor practice under section 8(a) (3).64 Moreover, in a
strike context, almost any active response by an employer to strike ac-
tivities will have a tendency to discourage (or encourage) membership
in a labor organization. In this context, therefore, application of section
8(a) (3) requires the additional consideration of two distinct interests:
(1) the employee's interest in the freedom to engage in union activity,
and (2) the employer's interest in operating his business.15 Thus, the
60. The House Committee Report on the Wagner Act succinctly makes this point:
The succeeding unfair labor practices are intended to amplify and state more spe-
cifically certain types of interference and restraint that experience has proved re-
quire such amplification and specification. These specific practices, as enumerated
in subsections (2), (3), (4) and (5), are not intended to limit in any way the
interpretation of the general provisions of subsection (1).
H.R. RFP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1935). See also S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 9 (1935).
61. See, e.g., NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941).
62. See, e.g., NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). The Supreme
Court in effect held that where (in a bargaining context) the employer does not violate
his duty to bargain collectively under § 8(a) (5), he does not interfere with protected § 7
rights.
63. Thus, in Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965), the
Supreme Court explicitly stated the dependency: "some employer decisions ...would never
constitute violations of § 8(a) (1) ...unless they also violated § 8(a) (3)."
. See also Local 357, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961), where the Court,
finding no violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3), framed its analysis solely in the terms of
the language of § 8(a)(3).
64. E.g., Rubin Bros. Footwear v. NLRB, 203 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1953).
65. See, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
See generally Getman, Section 8(a) (3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free
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conduct of the employer in operating his business is weighed against its
effect in discouraging or encouraging membership in a labor organiza-
tion.60
The basic criteria used in the interference test of section 8(a) (1),
which depends predominantly upon the protected character of the em-
ployee's activity, stands at an opposite pole. More specifically, if the
employee engages in a protected activity, an employer's act of inter-
ference, even if in good faith, may constitute an unfair labor practice. On
the one hand, therefore, the discrimination test requires that the em-
ployer act according to his good-faith beliefs, while on the other hand,
the interference test requires that he act correctly and sufficiently, re-
gardless of his beliefs.
In cases that involve application of both subsections, the Board
intertwines the two tests and gives greater emphasis to the rights of em-
ployees in their protected activity than to the employer's good faith
beliefs" In some cases, the courts determine the applicability of each
of the two subsections separately, but, nevertheless, intertwine the cri-
teria used for the tests employed under each subsection.68 The Supreme
Court has applied criteria normally used under the interference test of
section 8(a) (1) to determine the applicability of section 8(a) (3).69 In
another case where both subsections might have been applied, the Su-
preme Court held that where section 8(a) (1) is "plainly violated," the
employer's intent and good faith beliefs (under the discrimination test)
are ignored so that reliance may be placed entirely on the criteria of
the interference test.7°
Employee Choice, 32 U. Ciri. L. REV. 735 (1965), for a full discussion of the standards
which have been developed to govern the application of § 8(a)(3). His analysis led him to
find that the Board's liberal and mechanical interpretations in applying § 8(a)(3) resulted
in the courts' unduly limiting its application by requiring a showing of improper motive
even where the employer admittedly used union activity as the basis for his action.
66. See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1963).
67. E.g., Industrial Cotton Mills, 102 N.L.R.B. 1265 (1953); Rubin Bros. Footwear,
99 N.L.R.B. 610 (1952).
68. See NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941); Art Metals Constr. Co.
v. NLRB, 110 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1940).
69. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
70. NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, 379 U.S. 21 (1964) (where the employer discharged two
employees after being erroneously advised that they had threatened to dynamite company
property). The Supreme Court reasoned at 22-23:
We find it unnecessary to reach the questions raised under § 8(a)(3) for we are
of the view that in the context of this record § 8(a) (1) was plainly violated, what-
ever the employer's motive .... Defeat of [§ 7] rights by employer action does not
necessarily depend on the existence of an anti-union bias. . . . In sum, § 8(a) (1)
is violated if it is shown that the discharged employee was at the time engaged in
a protected activity, that the employer knew it was such, that the basis of discharge
was an alleged act of misconduct in the course of that activity, and that the em-
ployee was not, in fact, guilty of that misconduct.
Although the decision purported to deal only with cases of mistaken belief by the
employer, the reasoning would apply with equal force in many cases where proceeding
under § 8(a)(3) would be doubtful.
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IV. DISENTANGLEMENT OF THE CRITERIA
A. The Role of Employer Motive
Disentanglement of the criteria used for the discrimination and in-
terference tests centers on the role of "employer motive." A case study
analysis is required in order to show -the relevancy of employer motive
to a finding of an unfair labor practice under section 8(a) (3). Requiring
that the employer be motivated by a desire to discourage membership in
a labor organization would naturally tend to restrict the application of
section 8(a)(3). Conversely, requiring that the employer be motivated
by a proper business purpose would tend to broaden its application. The
employer's proper motive may be used to show either (1) that the act
was based not on union activities, but rather on a separate and distinct
business reason, 7 or (2) that -the act was a reaction to union activity,
taken to serve a proper business purpose.7 2
In Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB 78 the Supreme Court held the
employer guilty of an unfair labor practice without a finding of improper
motive. The Court noted that the employer's acts were not motivated by
opposition to unionism since there was no union bias in enforcing the
company's "no solicitation" rules."4 It did not matter that the employer
did not intend -to discourage union membership, since such enforcement
was a "foreseeable result.17 5 The Court, however, obscured the sig-
nificance of the role of the employer's motive under section 8(a)(3) by
its paramount finding that the rules were invalid under section 8 (a) (1)
because they interfered with protected section 7 rights when applied to
union solicitation. 76
In part II of its opinion in Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB 71 the
Supreme Court engaged in a full discussion of the necessity for proof of
the employer's motive. The Court, at the outset, limited the proscription
of 8(a)(3) to encouragement or discouragement of membership in a
labor organization by means of discrimination. The motivation of -the
employer in such discrimination was recognized as a required element
71. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), where union
membership did not insulate an employee from discipline for poor work or misconduct.
72. See, e.g., American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965), where in re-
sponse to an impasse in negotiations the employer closed down a plant and laid off em-
ployees.
73. 324 U.S. 793 (1945). The text discussion refers only to the Republic Aviation
portion of the case.
74. Id. at 805.
75. Id. The phrase "foreseeable result" was not used in the cited case but arose in the
Court's subsequent analysis of Republic Aviation in Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347
U.S. 17, 45-46 (1954).
76. The discussion of § 8(a) (3) was brief and ambiguous.
77. 347 U.S. 17, 42 (1954). Involved in this case were discriminating acts of encourage-
ment of union membership by employers, such as refusing to hire an employee for failure
to meet his union obligations.
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of proof.7" Moreover, it was stated that Congress intended the employer's
motive in discriminating to be controlling.79
Such logic, based on these judicial and congressional premises,
would no doubt lead to irrefutable results when applied in cases arising
under section 8(a) (3). But, at this juncture of the reasoning in Radio
Officer's Union, the Court took a step on to a path leading to a Pandora's
box, by stating that "specific evidence of intent to encourage or dis-
courage is not an indispensable element of proof of violation of § 8
(a) (3). '' 80 The box was reached when the Supreme Court used as its
basis the conclusions of the Board and lower federal courts that "proof
of certain types of discrimination satisfies the intent requirement."' ,
Finally, by dispensing with the specific proof of intent "where employer
conduct inherently encourages or discourages union membership," the
Pandora's box was opened.8 2 Confusion climbed out here because the
Court, first, did not explain the basis for accepting the premise that con-
duct which inherently encourages or discourages union membership is
proof of improper motive; second, did not define-even in general terms
-what constitutes conduct which inherently encourages or discourages
membership; and, third, did not allow for the going forward with evidence
to rebut the presumption of improper motive. 3
B. The Balancing Process
Some clarity emerged from NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.,84 where
the Court found that an employer commits an unfair labor practice under
section 8(a) when he extends a twenty-year seniority credit to strike re-
placements and strikers who leave the strike and return to work. 5
78. Id. at 43. Two prior cases are cited by the Court for this proposition: Associated
Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) (where the employer's real motive was decisive) ;
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 46 (1937) (where the employer's true
Purpose was the subject of investigation).
79. Id. at 44. The Court points out that with consistent congressional reports preceding
it, Congress chose to retain the identical language in its 1947 amendments.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 45.
82. Id. The Court blandly stated:
This recognition that specific proof of intent is unnecessary where employer con-
duct inherently encourages or discourages union membership is but an application
of the common-law rule that a man is held to intend the foreseeable consequences
of his conduct.
83. Confusion arises in this third area because the improper motive is at once a pre-
sumption and a conclusion by the trier of fact. The Supreme Court explicitly evidences its
own confusion thusly: "Concluding that encouragement or discouragement will result, it is
presumed that he intended such consequence." Id.
84. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
85. Id. at 221-22.
The employer argued before the Board that since super-seniority was granted to insure
a supply of replacements, it served the valid business purpose of hiring permanent replace-
ments under the Mackay Radio doctrine and therefore should not constitute a violation.
Although the Board recognized the valid business purpose, it pointed out that coupling the
Mackay Radio doctrine with super-seniority will more likely discourage participation in
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Although the Court proceeded on a basis of balancing of interests, it
also carved out a niche for the role of employer motive. 6 The Radio
Officer's case was used to recognize both the relevance and the dispens-
ability of employer motive in cases involving discriminatory conduct.8 7
The use of such criteria requires an examination of business decisions
and actions taken which involve "a complex of motives."88 From this
point, the Court described the two-part weighing and balancing test:
[P] referring one motive to another is in reality the far more
delicate task . . . [1] of weighing the interest of employees in
concerted activity against the interest of the employer in oper-
ating his business in a particular manner and [2] of balancing
in the light of the Act and its policy the intended consequences
upon employee rights against the business ends to be served by
the employer's conduct.89
Implicit in the weighing and balancing process is a two-step con-
sideration of employer motive. First, when improper motive is found
there is no need to engage in the balancing process, for proof of improper
motive is sufficient "to destroy the employer's claim of a legitimate
business purpose, if one is made, and provides strong support for a find-
ing that -there is interference with union rights or that union membership
will be discouraged." ' Second, where proof of improper motive is not
required because the discriminatory conduct inherently discourages or
encourages union membership, it becomes necessary to balance the in-
tended consequences of the conduct upon employee rights against the
employer's proper business purpose."
C. Separate Testing Under the Subsections
The first step deals with the case where proof of employer motive
is present, while the latter deals with the case where the conduct by its
strike activity than serve to supply replacements. Erie Resistor Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 621,
625-30 (1961).
86. Note that the employer was charged under § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3). See text dis-
cussion about intertwining subsections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) commencing at note 62 supra.
87. 373 U.S. at 227. Also cited was Local 357, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S.
667, 675 (1961), in which the court said, "Some conduct may by its very nature contain
the implications of the required intent ... "
88. 373 U.S. at 228.
89. Id. at 228-29. (Emphasis added).
90. Id. at 227-28.
91. In Erie Resistor it was felt that "the Board was entitled to treat this case as in-
volving conduct which carried its own indicia of intent and which is barred by the Act
unless saved from illegality by an overriding business purpose justifying the invasion of
union rights." Id. at 231.
The Court concluded at 236-37:
Consequently, because the Board's judgment was that the claimed business purpose
would not outweigh the necessary harm to employee rights-a judgment which
we sustain-it could properly put aside evidence of [employer's] motive and de-
cline to find whether the conduct was or was not prompted by the claimed business
purpose.
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nature affords proof of employer motive. Thus Erie Resistor does not
purport to cover the situation where there is neither proof of improper
motive nor conduct which inherently encourages or discourages union
membership. This void is filled by the two lockout cases of American
Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB 2 and NLRB v. Brown,9" both decided the same
day by the Supreme Court. Even though the facts of the two cases are
different, 4 they cover the same type of situation and consequently do not
deserve the utterly dissimilar approaches taken.
In American Ship Bldg. separate treatment was accorded sections
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) in considering the charges under each. No viola-
tion was found under section 8(a) (1), because the employer's use of the
lockout solely as economic pressure in support of a legitimate bargaining
position is not in any way inconsistent with the right to bargain collec-
tively or with the right to strike." In its discussion of the charge under
section 8(a) (3) the Court correctly ruled out the possibilities covered
in Erie Resistor; that is, proof of improper motive was not present and
the employer's conduct was not inherently "prejudicial to union inter-
ests" and not "devoid of significant economic justification."96 Without
such proof or such a determination, section 8(a) (3) leaves "unscathed
a wide range of employer actions taken to serve legitimate business
interests in some significant fashion, even though the act committed may
tend to discourage union membership."97 The lockout served the legit-
imate purpose of bringing pressure upon the union to modify its de-
mands.9 The approach taken by Mr. Justice Stewart is simply one of
judicial construction of a statute to reach a pre-conceived result.9 Ex-
cept for its broad language, the approach offers no guidelines for future
decisions; the opinion serves, rather, as an example of misuse of the
balancing test by the Board.1'
92. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
93. 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
94. The American Ship Bldg. case involved an impasse in bargaining which was
reached during negotiations to secure a new agreement for a current contract soon to expire.
The employer closed down one of four yards and laid off employees at others.
The Brown case involved a multi-employer bargaining group which locked out their
employees in response to a whipsaw strike against another member of the group. They and
the struck employer operated with temporary replacements.
95. 380 U.S. 300, 308 (1965).
96. Id. at 311.
No proof of improper motive was offered, apparently because of the Board's mechanical
position that normally a bargaining lockout improperly penalizes employees for engaging
in collective bargaining. See, e.g., Quaker State Oil Ref. Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 334 (1958).
The employer's conduct did not fall into the "inherently prejudicial" category because
of the Court's holding under § 8(a)(1) that the use of the lockout was legitimate.
97. 380 U.S. at 311.
98. Id. at 312.
99. "Such a construction of § 8(a) (3) is essential if due protection is to be accorded
the employer's right to manage his enterprise." Id. at 311.
100. [T]he Board construes its functions too expansively when it claims general
authority to define national labor policy by balancing the competing interests of
labor and management.
§§ 8(a) (1) and (3) do not give the Board a general authority to assess the
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The approach taken in Brown reaches the same result-namely,
the requirement of proof of improper motive in this type of situation
__'1 but offers guidelines built upon the balancing process clarified in
Erie Resistor. In its separate treatment of sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3),
the Court weighed the competing interests of the unions and manage-
ment. In considering the charge under 8(a)(1), the pressures on the
union were weighed against the employers' interests in operating their
businesses during the lockout period. °2 In finding no violation of section
8(a) (1), the Court noted that although "continued operations with the
use of temporary replacements may result in the failure of the whipsaw
strike," the employers' conduct serves a legitimate business end consis-
tent with the Act.103
The balancing principles, "analogous to the determination of un-
fair practices under § 8(a) (1),11104 were then used to consider the charge
under section 8(a)(3). Aside from a case in which improper employer
motive is proven, the balancing process is required in order -to weigh the
consequences of the employers' conduct upon the union's rights as
against the employers' legitimate and substantial business purpose. If
the balancing process is resolved against the employer, it means his
conduct is so inherently destructive of employee rights that the conduct
by its nature shows the improper motive. Conversely, when the process
is resolved in the employer's favor so that
the tendency to discourage union membership is comparatively
slight, and the employers' conduct is reasonably adapted to
achieve legitimte business ends or to deal with business exigen-
cies, we enter into an area where the improper motivation must
be established by independent evidence.'0 ,
The employers' conduct was held to be prima facie lawful because the
Court found both that the discouragement of membership was com-
paratively remote and that the conduct of staying open with temporary
replacements was reasonably adapted to the legitimate end of preserving
the multi-employer bargaining unit.106 Only a showing of improper sub-
jective motive can convert such conduct into an unfair labor practice
under section 8(a) (3).
relative economic power of the adversaries in the bargaining process and to deny
weapons to one party or the other because of its assessment of that party's bargain-
ing power.
Id. at 316-17.
101. 380 U.S. 278, 289 (1965). The court said: "Under these circumstances the finding
of an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(3) requires a showing of improper subjective
intent."
102. Id. at 286.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 287.
105. Id. at 287-88. (Emphasis added).
106. Id. at 289.
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V. RE-EVALUATION OF THE POLICY OF THE ACT
A. Assigning the Burden of Proof
In NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., °7 the Supreme Court elab-
orated upon the balancing process in a situation where the adverse effect
of the employer's discriminatory conduct upon employee rights is com-
paratively slight. The employer refused to pay striking employees vaca-
tion benefits which had accrued under a terminated collective bargaining
agreement, on the ground -that all contractual obligations had been ter-
minated by the strike. Shortly thereafter, the employer announced an
intention to pay vacation benefits to striker replacements, returning
strikers, and nonstrikers who had been at work on a specified date during
the strike. No proof of improper motive of the employer was offered.
The Board held that the refusal to pay vacation benefits to strikers,
coupled with the payments to nonstrikers, constituted an unfair labor
practice under section 8(a) (3).1 ° Reviewing the Board's decision, the
Court of Appeals found that the tendency of the conduct to discourage
union membership was comparatively slight and that there had been no
affirmative showing of improper motive. To comply with the other part
of the balancing test-that is, that the employer's conduct be reasonably
adapted to achieve legitimate business ends-the Court of Appeals, due
to the lack of employer's evidence, inferred several possible business
justifications for the employer's conduct. Thereupon the Board's order
was denied enforcement. 109
The Supreme Court relied heavily on its three recent opinions in-
volving employer motivation in the context of asserted section 8(a) (3)
violations: American Ship Bldg., Brown, and Erie Resistor.1 0 From the
review of these decisions, the Court "distilled" several principles of con-
trolling importance:
First, if it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's
discriminatory conduct was "inherently destructive" of impor-
tant employee rights, no proof of an antiunion motivation is
needed and the Board can find an unfair labor practice even if
the employer introduces evidence that the conduct was moti-
vated by business considerations. Second, if the adverse effect
of the discriminatory conduct on employee rights is "compar-
atively slight," an antiunion motivation must be proved to sus-
tain the charge if the employer has come forward with evidence
of legitimate and substantial business justifications for the con-
duct."'
These controlling principles, however, are in reality more than mere dis-
107. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
108. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 438 (1966).
109. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 363 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1966).
110. 388 U.S. at 32-34.
111. id. at 34. (Emphasis by the Court.)
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tillations; they enlarge and clarify the rules of the prior decisions to the
extent that they specifically assign the burden of proof. Thus, whether
the conduct is "inherently destructive" or the effect is "comparatively
slight," -the burden is upon the employer to establish that he was moti-
vated by legitimate business objectives because proof of motivation is
more available to him." 2 Since the employer failed to meet this burden
of proof, the Court found it unnecessary to decide which of the two situa-
tions governed, and held that the employer's discriminatory conduct
was an unfair labor practice.
The balancing process of weighing the intended consequences upon
employee rights against the business ends to be served by the employer's
conduct thus becomes subject to the prerequisite that the employer meet
his burden of proof. Only when the employer shows "legitimate and sub-
stantial business justifications" will it be necessary for the union to show
improper employer motives (by the conduct itself, if inherently destruc-
tive, or by evidentiary proof, if the effect is comparatively slight). La-
menting this alteration of the burden, Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissenting
opinion stated that it may either be "a rule of convenience important
to the resolution of this case alone or may, more unfortunately, portend
an important shift in the manner of deciding employer unfair labor
practice cases under § 8(a) (3)."""1 Harlan concluded that the majority
opinion beclouds sound prior interpretations of section 8(a)(3) in
order to reach a seemingly sympathetic result." 4
B. Legitimate and Substantial Business Justification
In the Great Dane Trailer case, legitimate and substantial business
justifications are cast in the form of an aspect of the burden of proof
within the overall balancing process. Although cast as such, -the form
solidifies into a test quite separate and apart from the balancing process
in NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co."' When former strikers applied for
work two days after the end of an economic strike and continued to
make known their availability and desire for reinstatement, the employer
explained he had no need for their services because of the cutback in
production. Nonetheless the employer at all times intended to resume
full production and to reactivate the jobs left vacant by the former
strikers. Upon such resumption the employer filled .the jobs with new
employees, and unfair labor practice charges were brought by the former
112. Id.
113. Id. at 38.
If the result merely requires the employer to come forward in order to make operative
the requirement of proof of improper motive, "then the Court has merely penalized [the
employer] for not anticipating this requirement . . . ." On the other hand, the Board may
use the word "substantial" in the burden of proof formulation to evaluate the employer's
business purposes and weigh them against the harm to employee interests, thereby exceeding
its function in the balancing process under the Act. Id. at 38-39.
114. Id. at 40.
115. 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
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strikers. The Supreme Court, in upholding the decision of the Board,
held that "because the employer here has not shown 'legitimate and sub-
stantial business justifications,' the discriminatory conduct constitutes
an unfair labor practice without reference to intent."'16
The decision briefly mentions the obvious relevancy of sections
2(3), 7 and 13 of the NLRA. 1" 7 Thereafter the reasoning is almost en-
tirely based on the legitimate and substantial business justifications test
of Great Dane. The Court managed to give lip service to the balancing
process in noting that the Board, and not the courts, has the primary
responsibility to balance the business justifications against the invasion
of employee rights."' But the course taken in the opinion ignores the
role of the Great Dane test as one factor in the balancing process; the
legitimate and substantial business justifications test becomes an abso-
lute standard to be met by the employer in order to avoid an unfair
labor practice violation."' The Court cited two reinstatement situations
in which the justifications had been both legitimate and substantial: (1)
permanent replacement of economic strikers under the Mackay Radio
case 20 and (2) job elimination to adapt to changes in business conditions
or to improve efficiency.'' Since neither these nor any other justifica-
tions were shown by the employer, and since the employer's conduct
could have adversely affected employee rights to some extent, it was un-
necessary to inquire into improper employer motive in order to find an
unfair labor practice. The right to reinstatement "can be defeated only
if the employer can show 'legitimate and substantial business justifica-
tions.' ,1122 Thus the Court's approach clearly made it unnecessary to
enter the balancing process in this situation.
C. The Impact of Great Dane and Fleetwood
The practical effect of the Great Dane and Fleetwood decisions
need not be exaggerated. In a recent case, 23 the Board applied their
holdings and underlying principles in order to overturn previous Board
rulings to the effect that, if a permanent replacement occupies an eco-
nomic striker's job at the time application for reinstatement is made,
the striker is thereafter entitled only to non-discriminatory consider-
ation as an applicant for new employment. 124 The case involved economic
116. Id. at 380. (Emphasis added).
117. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 157 and 163 (1964), respectively.
118. 389 U.S. at 378.
119. "[Ulnless the employer who refuses to reinstate strikers can show that his action
was due to 'legitimate and substantial business justifications' he is guilty of an unfair labor
practice." Id.
120. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
121. 389 U.S. at 379-80.
122. Id. at 381.
123. Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 175, 68 L.R.R.M. 1252 (June 13, 1968).
124. Brown & Root, Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. 486 (1961), enforced, 311 F.2d 447 (8th Cir.
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strikers who were permanently replaced, who made unconditional ap-
plication for reinstatement, and who continued to make known their
availability for employment. The strikers charged the employer with
unfair labor practices in the face of his conduct in hiring new employees,
rather than the strikers, to fill positions left by the departure of the
permanent replacements. The Board held that such economic strikers are
entitled to full reinstatement upon departure of the replacements, unless
they have in the meantime acquired regular and substantially equiv-
alent employment, or unless the employer can sustain his burden of proof
that the failure to offer full reinstatement was for legitimate and sub-
stantial business reasons. 125
Thus the Board has considerably dampened the long-standing hold-
ing of the Supreme Court in Mackay Radio.126 The economic striker no
longer risks the possibility of ultimate job forfeiture in the event of his
having been permanently replaced. Viewed in light of the economic and
social realities of the strike environment, it becomes apparent that many
permanent replacements in fact leave their employment upon termination
of the strike. The economic striker must, therefore, merely pass time by
earning compensation elsewhere or otherwise, save only that he must not
find regular and substantially equivalent employment.
Although the Board ruling cannot be ignored by employers, it may
be scrutinized for defects. The principle that the right to the job does not
depend on its availability at the precise moment of application is coupled
by the Board with another principle-that "strikers retain their status as
employees who are entitled to reinstatement absent substantial business
justification, and regardless of anti-union animus." 1 2 ' The former prin-
ciple, however, was applied by the Supreme Court in Fleetwood in a more
limited context, both from the standpoints of the factual situation and of
consistency with its prior decision in Mackay Radio. Fleetwood dealt
with a situation where the employer permanently replaced a portion of
the work force during the strike and simply had no available jobs at the
precise time the strike ended due to his cutback in production. The jobs
sought by the strikers were not filled by permanent replacements during
the strike.'28 The Board, on the other hand, was involved with strikers
who had been permanently replaced during the strike. The Supreme
Court, fully aware of the risk of the economic striker, applied the prin-
ciple consistently with the Mackay Radio doctrine so as to look past lack
1963) ; Atlas Storage Division, 112 N.L.R.B. 1175 (1955) ; Bartlett-Collins Co., 110 N.L.R.B.
395 (1954), aff'd, 230 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 988 (1956).
These Board Rulings followed in the aftermath of NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel.
Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), discussed in text accompanying note 36 supra and note 125 infra.
125. 171 N.L.R.B. No. 175, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1258.
126. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
127. 171 N.L.R.B. No. 175, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1257 (emphasis by the Board). The Board
labels these principles as holdings of Fleetwood and Great Dane. The Great Dane decision
nowhere mentions reinstatement rights of strikers.
128. 389 U.S. at 376-78.
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of job availability at the time of application to the real issue: whether
or not the striker had been permanently replaced during the strike.
What is more invidious is the Board's mis-application of the legiti-
mate and substantial business justifications test to a construction of
section 2(3) of the NLRA. 1 2' Although Fleetwood transforms the test
into an absolute standard to be met in order to avoid an unfair labor
practice under section 8(a), this transformation does not warrant its
use to clothe the striker with the status of an employee under section
2 (3), with an absolute right to reinstatement unless the test is met by the
employer.
The Board, however, in its subsequent discussion in the opinion,180
does show some recognition of the relation of business justifications to
employer conduct. Nevertheless, the employer need not meet his burden,
until it is shown that the employer's conduct could have adversely affected
employee rights.' The Board commits its most serious mistake in draw-
ing a parallel between the failure to fill unreplaced employees' positions
with strikers and the failure to fill permanently replaced employees'
positions with strikersY.2 The latter conduct does not in any way dis-
courage membership in a labor organization; its adverse effect is that
borne by any job applicant who, considered in a non-discriminatory man-
ner, simply did not get the job.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the Supreme Court must retreat somewhat from
the positions taken in Great Dane and Fleetwood if it is to adhere to the
underlying policy of the Act. Section 8(a) sets out the nature of pro-
hibited employer conduct. Because of the language used in subsections
8(a) (1) and 8(a)(3), there is a built-in tendency to intertwine the spe-
cific elements of the latter with the generic terms of the former. Applica-
tion of these sections by the Board and the courts affords protection of
employee rights to engage in concerted activity. The right to engage in
concerted activity, however, is not an end in itself; rather, it is an integral
part of the overall bargaining process between labor and management.
Thus the need arises to weigh, in light of the Act and its policy, "the
interests of employees in concerted activity against the interest of the
employer in operating his business in a particular manner ... Apart
from the rare instance where the employer's improper motive can be
proven, the balancing process offers the most practical method of giving
full and equitable consideration to both competing interests. Only then
will it be possible to comply with the Supreme Court's recognition that:
129. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964). The Board did not specifically cite the statute, but
rather referred to it indirectly. See quote in text accompanying note 126 supra.
130. 171 N.L.R.B. No. 175, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1257.
131. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967).
132. 171 N.L.R.B. No. 175, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1257.
133. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1963). For a full description
of the weighing and balancing test, see text discussion accompanying note 88 supra.
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at the present statutory stage of our national labor relations
policy, the two factors-necessity for good faith bargaining
between parties, and the availability of economic pressure de-
vices to each to make the other party incline to agree on one's
terms-exist side by side.'84
The far-reaching effect of the Great Dane and Fleetwood decisions-
that of truncating the balancing process into a one-sided consideration
of legitimate and substantial business justifications-does injustice to the
underlying policy of the Act by resulting in an imbalance favoring em-
ployee and union interests. Either the Supreme Court must retreat by re-
affirming the necessity for the balancing process, or the Act must be
amended to ensure that result.
134. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960).
